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CONSUMERTARIAN DEFAULT RULES
LIOR JACOB STRAHILEVITZ* & JAMIE LUGURI**
I
INTRODUCTION
Default rules fill in missing terms in contracts. A great deal of contracts
scholarship from recent decades tackles the question of how courts and other
legal institutions should pick gap-filler terms. In this Article we advocate an
approach that we call “consumertarian default rules.” Rather than trying to
identify the missing term that judges or legislators think both parties to a
consumer contract would have agreed to in the absence of transaction costs, we
propose focusing solely on the missing term that consumers in general expect.
Part II of this Article situates consumertarian default rules among wellknown alternative approaches to filling in missing contractual terms, such as
majoritarian default rules and penalty default rules. It explains that the
consumertarian approach can, in some contexts, address major shortcomings
associated with the more familiar alternatives. In the main, we suggest that it is
easier for courts or other decision-makers to identify the contents of a
consumertarian default rule, and that a consumertarian default rule is a penalty
default rule whose contours are relatively easy to determine ex ante and that
often provides an appropriately titrated penalty to promote information
revelation. Part III points to a few instances where courts already use
consumertarian default rules, albeit without providing a strong theoretical
explanation for that approach. Part III also considers more fully the ex ante
incentives created by consumertarian default rules.
Part IV reports on the results of an original study undertaken by the authors.
In the study, we collect data from a census-weighted sample of American adults
on consumer privacy expectations and preferences. Though consumer
preferences and expectations reveal heterogeneity with respect to common uses
of their data and precautions taken with their data by major technology firms like
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Google, Amazon, Facebook, and 23andMe, there are many domains in which a
rather clear consensus exists. After analyzing these data, we argue that defining
the content of consumertarian default rules is reasonably straightforward. The
study thus functions as a proof of concept for the consumertarian approach.
Part V discusses important variations in the consumertarian default rule
approach. We show how introducing friction can enable consumertarian defaults
to resemble mandatory rules. We also examine the design choices to be made
about whether consumertarian default rules are best tied to consumer
expectations or preferences where the two differ, and how they might be used
outside of the adversarial legal system. We conclude this Part by discussing the
application of the consumertarian approach to questions involving contractual
ambiguity, which may present distinct challenges from those associated with
contractual silence. In short, we argue that in various important contexts,
consumertarian default rules will be superior to alternatives such as majoritarian
default rules, mandatory rules, or penalty default rules that impose undesirable
terms on both parties.
II
DECIDING ON DEFAULT RULES
To make things concrete, let’s begin our analysis with a simple example.
Suppose Jane goes out of town and visits her destination airport’s Budget Rental
Car agency to rent a vehicle. Who can drive the car? The answer to this and any
other contract question depends on some combination of the words of the rental
agreement and any applicable default and mandatory rules provided by law. We
know what Budget’s rental terms say because the terms were relevant to the
outcome of a recent United States Supreme Court case.1 In this instance, the
question of who can drive the rental car is explicitly addressed by the following
language in Budget’s rental agreement:
I understand that the only ones permitted to drive the vehicle other than the renter are
the renter’s spouse, the renter’s co-employee (with the renter’s permission, while on
company business), or a person who appears at the time of the rental and signs an
Additional Driver Form. These other drivers must also be at least 25 years old and
validly licensed.
PERMITTING AN UNAUTHORIZED DRIVER TO OPERATE THE VEHICLE
IS A VIOLATION OF THE RENTAL AGREEMENT. THIS MAY RESULT IN
ANY AND ALL COVERAGE OTHERWISE PROVIDED BY THE RENTAL
AGREEMENT BEING VOID AND MY BEING FULLY RESPONSIBLE FOR
ALL LOSS OR DAMAGE, INCLUDING LIABILITY TO THIRD PARTIES.2

This language seems relatively clear cut, and the use of all-caps highlights
Budget’s effort to emphasize the importance of limits on who is authorized to
drive the vehicle that Jane is renting.

1. Byrd v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 1518 (2018).
2. Id. at 1524.
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The language entitles Budget to cancel the agreement if an unauthorized
driver operates the vehicle. Budget presumably emphasizes this language
because Budget expects that the person who rents a car is otherwise entitled to
authorize any other licensed driver to drive it. This is consistent with property
law’s general resistance to restraints on alienation—a car renter can lend the car
to a friend by default for the same reason that an apartment renter can lend the
home to a cat sitter while he is on vacation.3 Absent limits imposed by contracts
or statutes, renters can temporarily transfer their interests in property to third
parties.
Going beyond that first principle, rental car companies might have reasons to
be concerned even when their contract with a renter explicitly limits the renter’s
right to alienate an interest in the vehicle. Indeed, the case law governing rental
cars in at least some jurisdictions suggests as much. Courts have held that even
language like that contained in Budget’s contract can be inadequate to protect
the insurance company under statutory “no-fault” regimes if the person driving
the vehicle at the time of a collision did not realize that he was excluded from
coverage.4
In light of this case law and the contract language, the question of what
follows if various people drive the car that Jane is renting turns out to be
somewhat complicated. By the terms of the contract, Jane, her spouse, and her
co-workers—on company business—can drive the car if they are twenty-five or
older and have valid licenses. So can someone who signs an Additional Driver
form at the time Jane rents the car from Budget. If Jane authorizes someone else
to drive the car, then Budget can deem its rental agreement with Jane voided, but
this may not protect Budget against liability if that unauthorized driver is
involved in an accident, unless Budget can show that this driver knew he or she
lacked Budget’s permission to drive the car.
Now suppose a rental agreement provides no explicit terms regarding what
happens if the customer authorizes someone else to drive the car, and that driver
gets involved in a collision. Can Budget be liable if the non-authorized driver is
judgment proof? The standard approach from legal scholarship would be to
supply a majoritarian default rule. The terms of this default rule would be
determined based on what most customers and rental companies would prefer.
In determining what most customers and rental companies prefer, the law usually
would focus on what real-world, boundedly rational consumers and firms actually

3. For more on restraints on alienation generally, see Susan-Rose Ackerman, Inalienability and the
Theory of Property Rights, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 931 (1985).
4. See, e.g., Metro. Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Hertz, 981 P.2d 1091, 1092–94 (Colo. 1999) (en banc)
(holding that under the Colorado Auto Accident Reparations Act—a no-fault regime—the self-insured
car rental company is responsible for providing coverage because the driver was a “permissive user” once
given consent by the lessee); Progressive N. Insur. Co. v. Concord Gen. Mut. Ins. Co., 864 A.2d 368, 374–
78 (N.H. 2005) (ruling that an insurance company is liable for coverage of an accident even if the driver
is not covered if that driver has implied consent to drive the vehicle).
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want or expect.5 Identifying the rule that both parties would prefer has the
significant advantage of minimizing transaction costs—the law is supplying the
contractual provision that we think the parties would have agreed to if they had
the time and resources to specify their preferences ex ante.6 The problem is that
this process is much easier in theory than it is in practice.
At first blush, identifying the majority preference among consumers should
not be especially difficult. It would be relatively straightforward to survey rental
car customers and ask who else, besides the person signing the rental car
agreement, should be authorized to drive the car.7 It seems plausible that
customers would agree that when the contract is silent, the renter’s spouse gets
to drive. Consumers may make this assumption because those who have rented
cars before were generally told that their spouses could drive without the need to
sign an additional form. This established practice could create a corresponding
consumer expectation. Or perhaps customers want and expect their spouses to
be able to drive without a separate form because it is very convenient—
sometimes one spouse will head to baggage claim and the other will go to the
rental car counter to save time. Or occasionally the spouses will arrive on
separate flights a day or two apart. Making the later-arriving spouse go to the
rental counter as well imposes real transaction costs. Additionally, many couples
will want to divide driving duties, especially on longer trips. These normative
preferences may engender an expectation—consumers could expect to have a
right because they deem the right beneficial.
Here is where things get complicated, though. There is no such thing as a free
lunch. Consumers might expect to get particular rights under a contract, but likely
only if the cost of respecting those rights is relatively low for the counterparty.
For instance, suppose the cost to the rental car company of letting spouses drive
automatically is ten dollars per renter per day and suppose that consumers are,
on average, willing to pay no more than five dollars per day for that perk. Is it
appropriate to say that the consumer expects automatic spousal driving privileges
in that scenario? Even if doing so introduces into the contract a priced term that,
on balance, the average consumer does not want? It is hard to make progress on
this question theoretically, but progress might be made empirically as scholars try
to determine what consumers expect in various contractual arrangements. They
can also try to determine whether consumers’ expectations are driven largely by
wishful thinking or by pragmatic judgments about which kinds of rights are likely
to come at a cost that most consumers will want to bear.

5. See Yair Listokin, The Meaning of Contractual Silence: A Field Experiment, 2 J. LEGAL
ANALYSIS 397, 398–99 (2010).
6. See, e.g., Duncan v. Theratx, Inc., 775 A.2d 1019, 1027–28 (Del. 2001).
7. See Omri Ben-Shahar & Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Interpreting Contracts via Surveys and
Experiments, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1753, 1753 (2017) (advocating the use of surveys to determine the
meaning of disputed terms in contracts); see also John F. Coyle, Interpreting Forum Selection Clauses, 104
IOWA L. REV. 1791, 1797–98 (2019) (advancing a similar approach); John F. Coyle, The Canons of
Construction for Choice-of-Law Clauses, 92 WASH. L. REV. 631, 639–40 (2017) (same).
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A further complication deals with heterogeneity among consumers. Perhaps
the legal system will become more efficient by segmenting consumers into
different like-minded groups and giving each individual group the default terms
that their members prefer, which may be the opposite of what other groups of
consumers prefer or expect.8 Answering such questions will impose higher
assessment costs on courts. Errors are inevitable. Determining what an individual
consumer would have expected at the time of contract formation could be
challenging because consumers will often take self-serving positions and judges
may have a hard time getting inside their heads. In contrast, determining what
the median consumer expects in a survey of disinterested respondents is less
complicated.
Let us be clear about argumentative burdens before we continue. Our goal
here is not to convince readers that determining what consumers want or expect
is trivially easy. On the contrary, the process can be hard. Our goal is instead to
point out that it is easier to determine what the consensus expectation is on one
side of a consumer transaction than it is to determine accurately the expectations
on both sides of that transaction.9 Returning to our rental car example, figuring
out what the rental car company prefers is cumbersome too. At first glance, the
firm might want nobody other than the driver appearing at the rental desk to be
an authorized driver. This would reduce the company’s exposure if a driver is
involved in a collision and would allow rental car companies to vet each potential
driver more easily. But not so fast. Women get into fewer accidents than men on
average,10 and it may be that married heterosexual men are more likely than
married heterosexual women to appear at the rental counter in instances where
both have made the trip. A policy that lets heterosexual wives drive automatically
could result in safer drivers doing more of the driving, resulting in fewer collisions
involving rental cars.11
Moreover, in a competitive marketplace, companies that offer the
convenience of automatic spousal driving privileges may generate more revenue
8. See Ariel Porat & Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Personalizing Default Rules and Disclosure with Big
Data, 112 MICH. L. REV. 1417, 1417 (2014); Cass R. Sunstein, Deciding by Default, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1,
7 (2013).
9. When courts do this without the benefit of hard data, they are largely relying on intuitions or
anecdotes that may be misleading. An example of a court doing so is Dilullo v. Joseph, 792 A.2d 819,
822–23 (Conn. 2002), which purports to characterize landlord and tenant expectations in reliance on
treatise writers’ commentary rather than on any serious survey data.
10. This gender dynamic appears to exist for adolescent drivers, even accounting for young women
driving fewer miles than young men. See Alice Mannocci et al., Male Gender, Age, and Low Income Are
Risk Factors for Road Traffic Injuries Among Adolescents: An Umbrella Review of Systematic Reviews
and Meta-Analyses, 27 J. PUB. HEALTH: FROM THEORY TO PRAC. 263, 270 (2019). Interestingly,
however, with respect to adult drivers the gender disparity may be tied to differing activity levels by
gender. By some estimates men drive twice as much and are involved in twice as many accidents. See
Patrick Butler et al., Sex Divided Accident, Mileage, and Insurance Cost Data Show that Auto Insurers
Overcharge Most Women, 6 J. INSUR. REG. 243, 259–61 (1988).
11. This result is less likely if the aggregate distance that a married couple travels in a rental car will
be held constant, however, if accident rates do not vary by gender on a per-mile basis. See Butler et al.,
supra note 10, at 259–61.
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and incur fewer costs than companies with more restrictive policies. Married
drivers are less likely to be involved in accidents than unmarried drivers.12 Yet
car rental firms do not charge differential rates based on renters’ marital status.
This choice makes it unwise for rental companies to adopt pricing policies that
make the company’s cars more attractive to unmarried drivers and less attractive
to married drivers. Such a pricing scheme could prompt significant adverse
selection that would generate a higher accident rate.
Where there is a widespread customer preference that brings lucrative
business in the door, companies usually will satisfy that preference. But
companies might still prefer the less consumer-friendly rule if they think they can
get away with it, perhaps because of asymmetric information. So figuring out
what term the company prefers will depend on the extent to which the company’s
adoption of a less consumer-friendly term will be publicized to marginal
consumers.
Even when a company, for competitive or other reasons, would generally
prefer to adopt the same terms preferred by consumers, the law might go astray.
Opportunities for judges to craft default rules will usually arise after high-stakes
accidents, where the parties are litigating. In those instances, the company might
be reluctant to admit that a consumer-friendly default rule is what the company
prefers too, because such a concession may result in significant and certain
liability in the case of an accident that has already occurred. It is far better for the
firm to just adopt the consumer-friendly provision in its boilerplate contracts
after the litigated case is resolved. Judges aren’t perfect, so they may have a
difficult time realizing that a consumer-friendly default term would be preferable
to the company in the abstract, the company’s insincere protests to the contrary
notwithstanding.
Competitive dynamics would make things harder still for judges. If a company
has a dominant market position, say in a smaller city, then it might well prefer to
keep things simple and adopt quite restrictive rules about who can drive its cars.
In those circumstances the company’s preferences and their customers’
preferences may diverge, with the result being that there is no clear majoritarian
default rule. What then? If majoritarian default rules are based on welfare rather
than opinion, what is the right standard? Are majoritarian default rules supposed
to be Pareto efficient, or will Kaldor-Hicks efficiency suffice?13 If the standard
requires Pareto efficiency then there should be many situations in which
identifying a majoritarian default rule is impossible.
To complicate matters still more in our Budget rental car scenario, it seems
entirely plausible that other important relationships besides marriage would
12. David Hemenway & Sara J. Solnick, Fuzzy Dice, Dream Cars, and Indecent Gestures: Correlates
of Driver Behavior?, 25 ACCID. ANAL. & PREV. 161, 163 tbl. 1 (1993).
13. An allocation is Pareto efficient if any reallocation to make one individual better off makes
another worse off, whereas a resource reallocation is Kaldor-Hicks efficient if the winners gain more than
the losers lose, such that the former could compensate the latter enough to make everyone better off. See
James M. Buchanan, Positive Economics, Welfare Economics, and Political Economy, 2 J. L. & ECON.
124, 125 (1959).
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generate similar dynamics. Jane might want her fiancé, father, adult daughter,
best friend, or nanny to be able to drive the vehicle. It is far from clear in the
abstract what most consumers expect in these circumstances, and because
consumer preferences are uncertain, company preferences may be too.
Consumers generally would appreciate more flexibility about who can drive their
rental cars with their permission,14 but they might actually recognize that as rental
companies have less information about who their customers might share a rental
car with, adverse selection could occur.15 The insurer would need to pass along
the costs of losses associated with accidents by non-customers to all renters.
An alternative approach to this problem would be to develop a penalty
default rule or information-forcing default rule. That approach, introduced by
Ayres and Gertner in a now canonical article, would intentionally select an
unattractive default term that would be used in instances of contractual silence
or ambiguity.16 The classic formulation of a penalty default rule is a term that is
undesirable for both parties—like the Uniform Commercial Code’s provision
stating that if the parties do not specify a quantity of a product in their contract
the courts will assume the desired quantity is zero.17 However, Ayres and Gertner
also include within the definition of penalty default rules doctrines like contra
proferentem18 that are onerous for only one of the parties to a transaction.19 As
Ayres and Gertner note, such penalty default rules generally make sense when
they incentivize the more sophisticated party to initiate an interaction that will
result in the parties opting out of the penalty default.20 Penalty default rules
should rarely penalize consumers, who generally do not read contractual text and
often do not know much about substantive contract law.
One of the challenges for a court or legislature in creating a penalty default
rule is to identify exactly what the penalty term should be. It is perhaps not too
hard to identify defaults that will be unattractive to one or both parties, though
in an adversarial system the litigants are not likely keen to supply a court with
information about what terms would be genuinely unappealing to both of them.
But how severe should the penalty be? If the penalty is determined ex post, courts
may struggle to identify the penalty that will create optimal incentives going
14. There may be some cases where a consumer does not want a sibling or other relative to drive a
rental car but would prefer to not have to refuse a request. This tension among adult siblings is a plot
point in the classic Sam Shepard play, True West, for example. In those circumstances “blaming the rental
company” by pointing to language that voids the agreement could be a welcome restriction from the
customer’s perspective. See SAM SHEPARD, TRUE WEST act 1, sc. 2.
15. A party with a terrible driving record might encourage a third party to rent a vehicle that the
bad driver could then borrow.
16. See generally Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic
Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87 (1989).
17. Id. at 95–97 (citing U.C.C. § 2-201(1) (1976)).
18. Contra proferentem is a doctrine requiring “that, in the interpretation of documents, ambiguities
are to be construed unfavorably to the drafter.” Contra proferentem, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th
ed. 2019).
19. See Ayres & Gertner, supra note 16, at 105 n. 80.
20. Id. at 98–99.
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forward. And if the penalty is not precisely specified ex ante, how significant will
the problems of suboptimal incentives be?
For these reasons it may well be efficient for the law of consumer contracts to
decide ex ante that the terms of a penalty default rule will be determined based
on consumer expectations. Such an approach provides a metric for deciding upon
the default that (1) is relatively easy to replicate; (2) might be predictable ex ante
if the parties anticipate the relevant gaps in a contract; and (3) will consistently
provide moderate incentives for sophisticated parties to supply contractual terms
in advance. To be sure, there will still be some over- and under-deterrence, but
using consumer sentiment, as determined by rigorous surveys, to supply the terms
of a penalty default rule will supply a relatively coherent framework for
determining the contents of penalty default rules.
III
UNDERSTANDING CONSUMERTARIAN DEFAULT RULES
Consumertarian default rules identify the approach expected by a majority of
those similarly situated to the unsophisticated party in transactions with a
sophisticated entity.21 As we envision them, and as we explain in more depth
below, these consumertarian default rules can be crafted either to be easy to opt
out of or to be sticky, via frictions introduced by the legal system. The difficulty
of altering these consumertarian default rules can move them along a spectrum
between impossible-to-waive mandatory rules and easily-waived defaults.22
A perusal of the case law identifies some contexts in which courts have
embraced what appear to be consumertarian default rules. For example, in
determining when pension rights vest, the Wisconsin Supreme Court appeared
to focus on the expectations of retirees while ignoring the expectations of their
former employers.23 In deciding whether subrogation was permitted against an
insured policy holder’s uninsured fiancé, whose negligence had caused a fire, the
Connecticut Supreme Court honed in on the expectations of the policy holder
and fiancé while largely ignoring the expectations of the insurer.24 Indeed, courts
construing insurance contracts often focus entirely on the reasonable
expectations of the insured, construing any ambiguities in favor of the

21. This idea is mentioned, but not discussed at length, in Ian Ayres, Ya-Huh: There Are and Should
Be Penalty Default Rules, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 589, 597–98 (2006).
22. See Ian Ayres, Regulating Opt-Out: An Economic Theory of Altering Rules, 121 YALE L.J. 2032,
2087–88 (2012).
23. See Roth v. City of Glendale, 614 N.W.2d 467, 472–73 (Wis. 2000) (ruling that in the absence of
contract language or evidence to the contrary, a vesting presumption applies to retirees’ contracted-for
health benefits).
24. See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Palumbo, 994 A.2d 174, 184–88 (Conn. 2010); id. at 280, 290 (Zarella, J.,
dissenting) (“The majority . . . turns what should be an analysis of the expectations of all of the interested
parties—the insurer, the insured and the defendant—into a totality of the circumstances test that omits
any consideration of the insurer’s expectations.”).
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consumer.25 Some states have even gone so far as to privilege the expectations of
insurance consumers over the unambiguous text of the insurance contract, at
least where the consumer requested a certain type of coverage and was
incorrectly told by an insurance agent that the policy in question would provide
that coverage.26
The case for consumertarian default rules is partially based on efficiency
arguments, though the focus here will be on assessment costs—the costs for the
legal system of reaching the right answer27—rather than the more familiar
territory of transaction costs.28 For the reasons mentioned above, an informationconstrained judge may have an easier time ascertaining what consumers as a
whole expect, rather than determining what companies actually prefer. This is
because company preferences will depend on dynamic interactions with
consumer sentiment, the competitive environment, and asymmetric information.
More importantly, company perspectives may differ substantially ex ante and
ex post. This can occur when the stakes in litigation are high and when different
constituencies within a firm—say, the sales managers versus the customer service
managers versus the parts department—have very different preferences and
expectations with respect to relevant contingencies. These internal tensions can
be resolved by the CEO or General Counsel if conflicting expectations are
identified ex ante, but a lot of contract litigation involves determinations that
either were never made by management before contract execution or were
deemed too low-stakes to bother inserting relevant language. Indeed, contractual
silence sometimes may be a symptom of strong internal disagreement over what
contract terms a firm prefers, with the company lawyers or management electing
to finesse the issue by having the contract say nothing about the pertinent
contingency. In those instances, reconstructing what the company would have
preferred at the time the contract was executed is a tall order for judges.
What’s more, the sophisticated party in a consumer transaction, typically the
firm, drafts the agreement and is a repeat player who can likely anticipate which
scenarios may arise. Failures to clarify ambiguous terms in a contract or to supply
explicit terms to deal with a situation are problems for which the firm is almost
always the least cost avoider. This is the core insight behind the contract doctrine
25. See, e.g., Chase v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 780 A.2d 1123, 1127 (D.C. 2001) (“[A]mbiguities
in an insurance policy are construed against the insurer and in favor of the reasonable expectations of
the purchaser of the policy”) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
26. See Nunn v. Mass. Cas. Ins. Co., 758 F.3d 109, 114–17 (2d Cir. 2014) (construing Pennsylvania
law).
27. See James E. Krier & Stewart J. Schwab, Property Rules and Liability Rules: The Cathedral in
Another Light, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 440, 453–57 (1995).
28. To be sure, there is also a transaction costs justification for consumertarian default rules. Where
consumer expectations are widely shared, a savvy and attentive consumer can presume that her
expectations are the same as most peoples’ and bargain accordingly, with newfound knowledge of the
most likely resolution of any dispute concerning the import of contractual silence. It should be easier for
the typical consumer to identify the common expectation among consumers than it would be for that
consumer to identify the term that firms and consumers would collectively prefer or the term that would
maximize the parties’ joint welfare.
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of contra proferentem.29 Compelling firms to live with consumers’ preferences
when the contract is murky or silent incentivizes firms to specify those terms that
are salient in the deal beforehand.
Lastly, and relatedly, the consumertarian default rule penalizes the party that
has a meaningful opportunity to initiate the conversations that will generate the
kind of information that penalty default rules are designed to elicit. Sometimes,
as Ayres and Gertner argue, it is valuable for firms and consumers to reveal
private information to each other.30 These benefits can be significant for firms
and consumers alike, but it is unrealistic to put the onus of initiating these
information exchanges on unsophisticated consumers. In a transaction between
a firm and a consumer, the firm is much more likely than the consumer to be
aware of the relevant default rule than the consumer. Unless the consumer
regularly purchases the good or service at issue, she is likely to be ignorant about
both the gaps in a contract and how the law fills those gaps. Filling in a missing
term with a provision that disadvantages the consumer therefore makes little
sense.
To the extent that the consumer-friendly default term is inimical to the firm’s
interests, the firm will have an incentive to either supply an explicit contractual
term that makes the default irrelevant or to initiative the relevant conversation
with the consumer. In transactions between a sophisticated firm and an
unsophisticated consumer, the penalty default rule that provides an unappealing
choice to both parties is typically wasteful overkill.
IV
PRIVACY EXPECTATIONS AND PREFERENCES AS BASES FOR
CONSUMERTARIAN DEFAULT RULES
As we have indicated, consumertarian default rules are a type of penalty
default rule that may be particularly appealing in contexts where consumers have
relatively clear and coherent expectations, and where consumers are much less
sophisticated than the firms on the other side of their transactions. This idea
raises further questions, however—are consumer expectations reasonably welldefined and coherent? Is there any such thing as a majoritarian consumer
expectation that can be gleaned from survey research? Do consumer
expectations track more aspirational consumer preferences? We weren’t sure, so
the two of us designed a survey experiment to help figure out the answer.
In choosing a topic for our experiment, we focused on settings involving
consumer privacy and security, a domain that has generated enormous interest
of late in legal and policy circles. A further reason why the privacy and security
setting is an appealing setting in which to pose these questions has to do with
growing pressure to conform U.S. law to the General Data Protection Regulation
29. See Henry E. Smith, Modularity in Contracts: Boilerplate and Information Flow, 104 MICH. L.
REV. 1175, 1202 (2006).
30. Ayres & Gertner, supra note 16, at 94, 99.
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(GDPR). Some aspects of GDPR foreground consumer expectations in their
interactions with data processors. Namely, under Recital 47 of the GDPR, “the
reasonable expectations of data subjects based on their relationship with the
controller” may create a legal basis for the processing of personal information.31
This aspect of European law takes on heightened importance for American
audiences because so many U.S. corporations have to deal with GDPR, both
because the law is in some ways a template for what some states are doing about
consumer privacy, and because there is significant pressure towards
harmonization to facilitate trans-Atlantic data flows.
The study we describe here relied on a survey of a census-weighted
representative sample of American consumers recruited by the survey research
firm Dynata. The sample of 1,955 respondents was matched to U.S. adult census
weights for gender, age, race, education, and region.32 These survey respondents
were randomly assigned to answer a series of questions about either the level of
privacy they expect or the level of privacy they desire. They were also asked to
confront some of the tradeoffs associated with life in the modern world, where
consumers often trade personal information in exchange for a zero-cost service.
Respondents were asked a series of questions, and we often employed sevenpoint Likert scales with a “1” representing complete disagreement with a
statement and a “7” representing complete agreement with a statement. Thus,
mean responses above a “4” indicate that respondents were, on average, likely to
agree with a statement. Other questions were administered as binary queries.
We asked questions about how Amazon, Facebook, Google, and 23andMe
customers think that those companies use their data, and what they believed their
rights to these data were. On the whole, the majority of the respondents had
similar answers to these questions. Like previous research, this study reveals that
31. Regulation 2016/679, of the European Parliament and the Council of 27 April 2016 on the
protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement
of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation), 2016 O.J. (L 119)
47.
32. More precisely, the sample included 47% men and 53% women; it was 76% Caucasian, 13%
African American, 4.5% Asian American, 14% Latino, and 6% other races. Six percent of the sample
lacked high school educations, 30% had only high school diplomas, 30% attended college but did not
graduate or earned an associates’ degree, 21% were college graduates, and 13% had graduate or
professional degrees. The main regions of the country and age ranges in the sample were proportional to
the adult U.S. population. The sample was very close to census-weighted targets across all dimensions,
with the exception of those with less than a high school degree. People who hadn’t graduated from high
school accounted for 6% of our sample but are approximately 11% of U.S. adults. Sampling poorlyeducated Americans online is a persistent challenge, both because they are more likely to lack Internet
access and because their levels of literacy will be lower, which can prompt higher rates of attrition and
failed attention checks.
Note that these data we collected and report here was also summarized in the Stigler Committee
on Digital Platforms, Market Structure and Antitrust Subcommittee Report, July 2019, a white paper
that we co-authored. Stigler Committee on Digital Platforms, Market Structure and Antitrust
Subcommittee Report, July 2019, available at https://research.chicagobooth.edu/-/media/research/stigler/
pdfs/digital-platforms—-committee-report—-stigler-center.pdf?la=en&hash=2D23583FF8BC/
C560B7FEF7A81E1F95C1DDC5225E&hash/=2D23583FF8BCC560B7F/EF7A81E1F95C1DDC5225E
[https://perma.cc/7FA3-WGU6].
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there was substantial heterogeneity in terms of how consumers expect companies
to collect, use, and safeguard personal information.33 That said, identifying a
consensus consumer sentiment is pretty straightforward in key concepts,
suggesting that the practical problems associated with identifying consumertarian
default rules are manageable.
For example, we asked a series of questions about a smart speaker patterned
after the Amazon Echo and its Alexa virtual assistant. Half of respondents were
told about a scenario involving the Echo and the other half were told the same
facts with respect to a start-up that was competing with Amazon. In general, using
a company familiar to consumers versus a fictitious start-up had no significant
effects on subjects’ responses, so we report responses that collapse the real and
fake company vignettes here. In a binary question, a supermajority of
respondents (71%) understood that Amazon would store voice commands that a
consumer gave to an Echo smart speaker, and among those respondents who
understood such storage would occur, the majority stated that this information
would be deleted either when a user actively deleted that information (48%) or
when Amazon elected to do so (32%). This consensus understanding is consistent
with Amazon’s policies, which enable deletion by the company or the user. Only
21% thought the information would be automatically deleted by default, either
within a year (10%) or after a period longer than a year (11%). Respondents
were rather evenly divided on whether the law permitted Amazon to pool
information with Fitbit to identify customers who were likely to be training for
long-distance races (mean = 3.88 on a 7-point scale; standard deviation (SD) =
1.98). A narrow majority was not inclined to believe the law permits Amazon to
sell information it collects via Echo devices to companies, such as music
streaming services (mean = 3.57; SD = 2.04). U.S. law presently does not prohibit
such transfers of data.
From a review of its privacy policies,34 it appears that Amazon probably does
not sell personally identifiable Echo data to third parties like music streaming
services. Though the policy is not clear in this respect, there do not appear to be
any limits on the transfer of aggregated data, and the policies could be changed
by Amazon at any time. It is not evident from Amazon’s privacy policies that
there are limits on the company’s ability to purchase data from a third party like
Fitbit, aggregate that database with Amazon’s own data, and then identify
particular kinds of consumers—for example long-distance runners—on that
basis.
Respondents who were asked about Amazon Echo smart speakers were
divided on the question of whether they would be willing to pay extra for a
33. See, e.g., Serena Zheng et al., User Perceptions of Smart Home IoT Privacy, 2 PROC. ACM
HUMAN-COMPUTER INTERACTIONS 200:1, 200:1, 200:17 (2018); Aleecia M. McDonald, & Lorrie Faith
Cranor, Beliefs and Behaviors: Internet Users’ Understanding of Behavioral Advertising, Paper presented
at 2010 TPRC—43rd Research Conference on Communication, Information and Internet Policy (2010),
1, 27.
34. Amazon Privacy Notice, AMAZON (Aug. 29, 2017), https://www.amazon.com/gp/help/customer/
display.html?nodeId=468496 [https://perma.cc/6SUZ-A2QE].
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version of the Echo that did not share users’ personal information with other
companies. About 38% of respondents said they were willing to do so, and on
average they stated that they would be willing to pay an extra $58 to $79 for such
a privacy-protective option after being told that the base price for an Echo was
about $150, though the standard deviations were very high. The data suggest a
substantial minority of consumers might be willing to pay significantly more for
a smart speaker with these features, though even if these contingent valuations
are reliable it is possible that Amazon generates more than this amount of
revenue from the information supplied by each household with an Echo.
When researchers examine respondents’ normative views it becomes evident
they view the storage and transfer of data from Amazon Echo devices as
distressing. A clear majority believe Amazon should not store such information,
and there is a strong consensus among respondents that it would be undesirable
for Amazon to share information it collects with a music streaming service (mean
= 1.98; SD = 1.66) or merge Echo data with Fitbit data to identify long-distance
runners (mean = 2.40; SD = 1.82). Respondents were also much more likely to
say that Amazon should delete users’ voice commands automatically and within
a year of their collection (31% of sample) than was true in the descriptive
condition.35
There were similar dynamics at play when respondents were asked about the
use of facial recognition data by Facebook and similar social networking
platforms. Most respondents understood that Facebook does use facial
recognition technology to help it create templates to recognize its users in
uploaded photos (mean = 4.58; SD = 2.01), and that it retains these data until a
user or Facebook deletes it: 44% said until a user deletes; 36% said until
Facebook chooses to delete it, and 21% said it is automatically deleted. Users
were divided over whether Facebook is allowed to share facial recognition
information with a third party such as a maker of police body cameras, though a
narrow majority of the representative sample said the practice was not permitted
(mean = 3.66, with “1” indicating “definitely impermissible”; SD = 2.08).36 When
asked for a normative judgment about such information-sharing with a body
35. Respondents were either given entirely descriptive or entirely normative questions to reduce
confusion, and there was random assignment between the two conditions.
36. By mid-2019, we believe that only Oregon and New Hampshire had laws prohibiting the use of
facial recognition technology in police body cameras. See Reis Thebault, California Could Become the
Largest State to Ban Facial Recognition in Body Cameras, WASH. POST (Sept. 11, 2019),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2019/09/12/california-could-become-largest-state-banfacial-recognition-body-cameras/?noredirect=on [https://perma.cc/9EKP-XQ3U]. Interestingly, about
six months after we collected these data, California’s legislature approved legislation prohibiting the use
of facial recognition technology in police body cameras. See Anita Chabria, California Could Soon Ban
Facial Recognition Technology on Police Body Cameras, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 12, 2019),
https://www.latimes.com/california/story/2019-09-12/facial-recognition-police-body-cameras-californialegislation [https://perma.cc/V9KD-PUGQ] (“Taking one of the toughest stands in the nation against
police use of facial recognition technology, California lawmakers on Thursday passed legislation barring
police from installing it on body-worn cameras for three years.”). If these prohibitions spread to other
states, we will be in a strong position to study precisely whether and how changes in the law altered
consumer preferences and expectations.
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camera firm, respondents were much more hostile (mean = 2.40; SD = 1.95). It
appears from Facebook’s full data use policy that Facebook does not engage in
such third-party transfers of user information, though the prohibition applies to
sales and could be altered by Facebook, at least outside of Illinois.37
Respondents were also close to evenly divided on the question of whether
Facebook uses information from its facial recognition algorithm to tag users in
photos uploaded to the site by other users (mean = 4.40; SD = 2.05)—Facebook
does engage in this practice unless a user objects. Again, posing the question to
consumers as a normative one about what the law should permit lowered these
values by a little over one point (mean = 3.30; SD = 2.07). The divide between
consumers’ expectations and their preferences is particularly stark when
consumers are presented with binary choices. Fully 67% of respondents said that
Facebook is allowed to store users’ facial information that it connects with its
facial recognition technology but only 36% of respondents said that Facebook
should be able to store such information.
The same basic pattern played out with respect to Google and its collection
and storage of information from Google Maps. A supermajority of respondents
(68%) believe that Google retains data about a Google Maps user’s geolocation
after the completion of the trip, and that this information is retained until either
Google (37%) or the user (34%) elects to delete it. A majority of respondents
(mean = 4.31; SD = 2.08) believe that Google Maps is permitted to track a user’s
location whenever the phone is turned on, even when the app is not in use, as
long as the user consents to this when first using the app. On the other hand, most
people had normative objections to such tracking, with a mean response of 2.44
(SD = 1.95). Respondents were pretty evenly divided over questions involving
Google’s sharing of geolocation information collected through Google Maps.
About half of respondents (mean = 4.13; SD = 2.08) thought Google is legally
permitted to share data about individual users’ whereabouts with stores and
restaurants that wanted to deliver advertisements to customers who were nearby,
though again normative views were rather hostile (mean = 2.70; SD = 2.04). A
little less than half of respondents thought Google is legally permitted to sell data
it collected about individual users to generate the revenue necessary to provide
other services to consumers free of charge (mean = 3.74; SD = 2.15). And a clear
majority again said Google should not be permitted to engage in such behavior
(mean = 2.44; SD = 1.95).
This is not to say that users are hostile to data collection by Google. A
significant majority of respondents (mean = 5.16; SD = 1.87) agreed that Google
can collect data on where Google Maps users go when using the app, and a
narrow majority (mean = 4.11; SD = 2.17) even agreed that it was normatively
acceptable for Google to do so. In short, users anticipate that Google will collect
37. Illinois has enacted the Biometric Information Privacy Act., 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 14 (2008)
(imposing restrictions on how private entities collect, keep, and disclose biometric information, like facial
recognition data). For discussion of the Act, see Rosenbach v. Six Flags Entm’t Corp., 129 N.E.3d 1197
(Ill. 2019).
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geolocation data, and many subjects find that behavior acceptable, but they
object to the downstream transfer of that information and to its transfer,
retention, and collection while the app is not in use.
Genetic testing is another area where consumer privacy concerns can become
salient, and testing companies like 23andMe have satisfied their customers’
curiosity about their genetic information, while raising privacy alarms. The
privacy externalities associated with 23andMe are particularly grave—one
member of a family can expose the genetic information of all their relatives to
scrutiny by providing a DNA sample, and there is not really anything someone
can do to prevent their biological relatives from compromising their genetic
information in that way.
The dangers of shared genetic information perhaps explain why the
disconnect between what consumers expect and what consumers say 23andMe
should be able to do was so large. Fully 74% of respondents said that 23andMe
is allowed to store information about their genetics whereas just 23% said the
company ought to be allowed to retain that information. Similarly, respondents
mostly thought that 23andMe is not allowed to sell customers genetic data to
pharmaceutical companies for research purposes (mean = 3.38; SD = 2.04), to
consumer goods companies that wanted to deliver targeted ads (mean = 3.23; SD
= 2.03) or sell it so as to lower the cost of 23andMe’s services and increase the
company’s profits (mean = 3.23; SD = 1.96). Responses were even harsher when
these questions were framed normatively, with mean responses of 2.08 on the
research question (SD = 1.72), 1.89 on the targeted ads question (SD = 1.60), and
2.09 on the decreased prices and increased profits question (SD = 1.72).
There are few limits in existing U.S. law concerning who 23andMe can
transfer genetic information to, though there are some limits on what health
insurers and employers can do with genetic information obtained from
23andMe.38 The data suggest a promising opportunity to use consumertarian
default rules to limit such transfers, at least as a starting point.
Another domain where both consumer expectations and consumer
preferences are strongly protective of privacy involves the encryption of personal
information. In each of the technological contexts we studied, respondents were
asked whether firms either are or should be required to use encryption to
decrease the chances of a data breach. Respondent sentiment was rather uniform.
Consumers said Google is required (mean = 4.85; SD = 1.84) and ought to be
required (mean = 5.60; SD = 2.03) to encrypt any data it collects from its users’
emails.39 This trend holds true with any Google Maps data stored by the company
38. See Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-233, 122 Stat. 881
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000ff–2000ff-11 (2012)).
39. The data reported here reflect the aggregate responses of consumers who were asked about
Gmail and a fictitious start-up competing with Gmail called Mail Me. In general, consistent differences
did not emerge in terms of what respondents expected or preferred from established companies and startups, so we collapsed the categories for the sake of our analysis. In some of our questions, consumers did
seem to expect more privacy when an established company like Google held email compared to a new
entrant. So the descriptive mean was 5.11 for Gmail and 4.70 for Mail Me. But in other questions—
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(descriptive mean = 5.03; SD = 1.94; normative mean = 5.58; SD = 1.95).
Consumers had the same basic take on Amazon’s encryption of voice commands,
with a mean response of 5.78 (SD = 1.68) to what should be required of smart
speaker companies and a 4.20 mean response (SD = 1.65) to what is required of
them.
The divide between normative and descriptive answers shrunk in the case of
Facebook’s use of data from its facial recognition algorithms, with a mean of 5.37
(SD = 2.05) in the normative condition and 4.80 (SD = 1.91) in the descriptive
condition. When the topic shifted to geolocation information gathered by a
phone carrier from cell towers, means were quite similar. The mean response was
5.50 (SD = 1.99) in the normative condition and 4.81 (SD = 1.88) in the descriptive
condition. Finally, genetic information held by 23andMe and similar companies
generated the most privacy protective means on the descriptive query.
Respondents gave a mean response of 4.97 (SD = 1.86) when asked whether
23andMe is required by law to encrypt any genetic data it stores about its
customers in order to decrease the chances of a data breach. Subjects’ normative
responses were also at the high end of the scale (mean = 5.75; SD = 1.88).
A few aspects of the encryption data deserve emphasis. First, in every single
instance where subjects were surveyed, the majority sentiment reflected both an
expectation of encryption and a stronger preference for encryption. This is
striking because, as we see above, consumers are often rather cynical about the
level of privacy protections that is required by law. Fascinatingly, however, those
expectations of legally-required encryption of data are off-base in this case.
Although the fear of class action lawsuits stemming from data breaches or of
Federal Trade Commission enforcement actions for unfair and deceptive
practices could provide firms with incentives to encrypt sensitive personal
information, there is no federal law that broadly requires the encryption of this
kind of information. Consumers, then, seem to presuppose a legal requirement
that does not really exist, and their reliance on this mistaken assumption may
heighten their comfort level with companies’ storage and processing of their
personal information.
In these circumstances, where consumers broadly expect—and very broadly
want—a level of data security that firms are not providing, it is particularly
appropriate to employ consumertarian default rules. If firms are not in fact going
to encrypt sensitive genetic, geolocation, email, or biometric information, then
they ought to be required to make it very clear to consumers that these
precautions are not being employed, so that consumers can adjust their priors,
alter their behavior, or take their business elsewhere. Boilerplate disclosures
buried in terms and conditions or privacy policies are plainly inadequate to
correct widespread erroneous consumer expectations.
Facebook versus the start-up entrant Pixelle—the mean expectations were not statistically different (4.87
versus 4.77) and in one question—Verizon Wireless versus the start-up phone company Quantum
Wireless—respondents actually had higher encryption expectations of the start-up: 4.75 for Verizon
versus 4.87 for Quantum.
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We share the data on subjects’ expectations and preferences with respect to
privacy and security for several reasons. First, the data provide a useful pilot test
of the feasibility of using consumer sentiment to fill in default terms in contracts.
Consumer preferences tend to be rather protective of privacy, and this is true
even when they are asked to consider the tradeoffs that companies make in a
market economy, where personal information is treated as a substitute form of
currency. Consumer expectations, on the other hand, often recognize that their
data may be used in ways with which consumers are uneasy, and in some cases
consumers are evenly divided. Where consumer preferences and expectations
align, using either one to fill in the default rule is easy enough. In those instances
where they diverge, however, choosing which one should inform the content of a
default rule requires further thought. We consider that issue in more depth in
part V.
Second, the data indicate that in some substantive domains, a reasonably
strong consensus exists among consumers. To be sure, there is some
heterogeneity, both in terms of what consumers expect and what they prefer. But
consumer views are not randomly distributed. Provided the ground rules of which
metrics to use are resolved ex ante and the choice architecture presented to
consumers is not unduly biased, consumer sentiment can provide coherent
answers to the question of how defaults should be determined across a variety of
privacy and security domains.
Third, the data presented are interesting in their own right. One common
critique of rendering lay expectations legally relevant, particularly where privacy
is concerned, is that such expectations are circular. At first glance, the law drives
lay expectations, which would in turn determine the law. In other work, one of
us has pushed back strongly on this idea, presenting data showing general
stability in privacy expectations before and after significant changes in relevant
law.40 For the present study, we lack a baseline level of privacy expectations with
these companies and vignettes. So we cannot say right now whether and how
expectations have shifted over time. But in several instances, practices that
companies are evidently engaged in, like 23andMe’s sale of genetic information
to pharmaceutical partners,41 is contrary to the evident expectations of the
majority of American adults. If a company claims that consumers know what the
company is doing with their data and acquiesce through their inaction, it is
making a fundamentally empirical statement that can be confirmed or falsified
with the kind of data we have collected.

40. Matthew B. Kugler & Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, The Myth of Fourth Amendment Circularity, 84
U. CHI. L. REV. 1747, 1747 (2017).
41. David Pierson & James Paton, 23andMe sells $300-million stake to GlaxoSmithKline and will
help develop drugs, L.A. TIMES (July 25, 2018) https://www.latimes.com/business/technology/la-fi-tn23andme-gsk-20180725-story.html [https://perma.cc/ENN4-FXNL].
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V
VARIATIONS AND FLEXIBILITY UNDER A CONSUMERTARIAN APPROACH
One of the potentially appealing aspects of consumertarian default rules, and
also a potential pitfall, is that they can be tailored to provide greater or lesser
protection to consumers. Here we will discuss major levers that can be used to
calibrate the extent of protection under a consumertarian approach, depending
on the policy preferences of the relevant policymaker.
The first key fork in the road is the decision to tie consumertarian default
rules to consumer preferences or consumer expectations. As the data presented
above suggest, this decision will sometimes be outcome-determinative. For
example, Americans seem to understand that 23andMe is collecting and storing
its customers’ genetic information or that Google Maps is allowed to store its
users’ geolocation information, but they object to both practices. Perhaps the
cleanest illustration of this phenomenon arose in a survey question we posed
about Verizon Wireless’s collection of geolocation information—65% of our
respondents said that Verizon is allowed to store information about its
customers’ locations and 65% of respondents said Verizon should not be allowed
to do so. In that situation, what is the consumertarian default?
Using consumer expectations presents a more natural fit with existing law.
Many states already use existing consumer expectations to fill gaps in contracts;
for example, in insurance disputes.42 In our view, however, either expectations or
preferences can provide a defensible benchmark for consumertarian defaults.
The less principled but perhaps more satisfying approach of averaging the two
may be appealing in the alternative.43 In any event, we suspect the normative
versus descriptive divide is not limited to privacy and security contexts at all.
Rather, there often will be a disconnect between what consumers aspire to
receive and what they expect. This divide could well be larger for lower-priced
goods and services as opposed to luxury goods and services, where consumers
may be paying a premium for firms’ “customer is always right” ethos. With
respect to privacy preferences, we can be rather confident that choosing
consumer expectations as a benchmark for consumertarian default rules will
result in relatively producer-friendly defaults. Different jurisdictions might
choose one benchmark or the other based on their political values and the
preferences of the legislature. The main goal should be to pick a metric and then
keep it stable and consistent across different classes of goods and services. That
will make the law predictable and easier to enforce.
A second key lever for calibration to policy preferences involves the ease or
difficulty of opting out of the consumertarian default. As everyone now
42. See, e.g. Chase v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 780 A.2d 1123, 1127 (D.C. 2001).
43. Obviously, in the Verizon situation, averaging subjects’ normative and descriptive responses
results in an equal divide over whether storage of geolocation information is permitted. Where opinion
is that closely divided consumertarian default rules will not offer much help. Of course, neither will
majoritarian default rules, since determining what term consumers would agree to is an essential part of
determining the content of a majoritarian default rule as well.
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understands, consumers do not read terms of service, nor do they read other
dense provisions in contract text.44 One worry about shifting from majoritarian
default rules to consumertarian default rules is that this shift will prompt firms to
invest more heavily in identifying contingencies and contractual ambiguities ex
ante, and then adding boilerplate language that addresses the situation, often in
a way that is more favorable to the firm than to the consumer. Related research
by Lauren Willis shows that banks have been quite effective at convincing
consumers to waive default protections conferred on them by federal law
concerning bank overdraft fees.45 She finds that firms can be successful at
overcoming sticky defaults when (1) they have a strong motivation to do so; (2)
they have opportunities to ask consumers to waive their rights; (3) consumers
find the decision-making environment confusing; and (4) consumer preferences
are not well-defined. The result could be that consumertarian default rules do not
actually help consumers that much and also contribute to the creation of
consumer contracts that are even longer than the ones that currently exist. These
are legitimate concerns and a potentially perverse side-effect of consumertarian
default rules. That said, these dynamic effects are not inevitable.
The reason they are not inevitable has to do with the ability of policymakers
to impose friction on opt-outs of the consumertarian default. In the privacy
context, for example, firms might be prohibited from bundling together different
provisions, and the law might require that any opt-out directed at consumers be
clear, conspicuous, and narrow in its scope. Thus, in order to get consumers to
waive the default protections, the law might require firms to obtain consent for
each and every meaningful deviation from consumer expectations. To take an
example from our survey data, 23andMe could be required to get consumer
consent to share genetic information with pharmaceutical researchers, a separate
consumer consent to share genetic information with behavioral marketers, and
still another separate consent if the company wanted to transfer the information
to law enforcement for the creation of a DNA database.
Asking consumers to waive particular consumertarian default rights means
imposing on customers’ time. With anti-bundling provisions patterned after the
kinds of single subject voting rules that exist in states that have referenda and
initiatives,46 the law could prevent companies from getting consumers to waive
rights they value by pairing such waivers with access to goods and services that
44. See, e.g., Bakos et al., Does Anyone Read the Fine Print? Consumer Attention to Standard-Form
Contracts, 43 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 1 (2014) (“[O]nly one or two of every 1,000 retail software shoppers
access the license agreement”); Robert A. Hillman & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Standard-Form Contracting
in the Electronic Age, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 429, 445–454 (2002) (arguing that “rational” market failures,
social forces, and cognitive factors may all unite to limit consumers’ incentive to read boilerplate
contracts).
45. See Lauren E. Willis, When Nudges Fail: Slippery Defaults, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 1155, 1192–1201
(2013) (arguing that banks use tactics playing on consumers’ fear of change, use language that appears
mandatory, and provide incentives to making an immediate decision without further thought to induce
consumers to waive these default protections).
46. See Robert D. Cooter & Michael D. Gilbert, A Theory of Direct Democracy and the Single
Subject Rule, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 687, 687 (2010).
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consumers value more. The law can also regard efforts to secure consent via user
interfaces that employ dark patterns and other manipulative techniques as
inadequate to secure valid waivers of consumer rights protected by default.47
Under a stricter approach, waivers of consumertarian default rules would have
to meet the standard that prevails in American courts where key rights are at
stake—there must be a knowing and voluntary waiver of a right. Rituals that
some courts have deemed sufficient to create a contract—for example presenting
consumers with an avalanche of complicated text that the firm knows nearly no
consumers will read—would not satisfy this heightened standard.
With such friction added to the system, consumertarian default rules will
become stickier, and in some cases they could begin to resemble mandatory rules.
Firms might not want to initiate those kinds of conversations very often, and they
will not want to do that with respect to low-stakes issues. Rather, they will of
necessity pick their battles. Asking consumers to waive rights would squander
some goodwill that firms have accumulated with consumers and would risk losing
customers. The benefits of making contracts customizable will be greater when
consumer sentiment is more heterogeneous.48
Moreover, in cases where personal data is concerned, contractual silence will
no longer benefit firms if a company is using that personal data in ways that
counter consumer expectations and preferences. Rather, such silence will
become an obstacle that firms need to overcome if the benefits of obtaining
meaningful customer consent are high enough. Some firms will decide that the
process of informing their customers of what they want to do and why they want
to do it will spook enough of their customers away from using their good or
service to render it unwise to seek permission to waive a default. Requests that
would reveal unsavory or controversial data practices may bring unwelcome
regulatory scrutiny as well.
47. See Jamie Luguri & Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Shining a Light on Dark Patterns, 1 (Univ. of Chi.
Law Sch. Pub. Law, Working Paper No. 719, 2019), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?/abstract/
_id=3431205 [https://perma.cc/L48A-YTDK] (“Dark patterns are user interfaces whose designers
knowingly confuse users, make it difficult for users to express their actual preferences, or manipulate
users into taking certain actions [by] exploit[ing] cognitive biases and prompt[ing] online consumers to
purchase goods and services that they do not want, or . . . reveal[ing] personal information they would
prefer not to disclose.”).
48. This discussion may raise in the minds of many readers the following question: Why not go all
the way towards mandatory consumertarian rules? Such an approach offers some of the virtues of
consumertarian defaults but would also prevent firms from exploiting the tendency of consumers to not
read contractual boilerplate or the text of waivers. There are and should be a role for mandatory rules,
but the domain where default rules are more appropriate is important too. For instance, suppose a
company is using a novel business model that holds significant promise but flies in the face of existing
consumer expectations. A mandatory rule would suffocate the business model in the crib. A
consumertarian default rule would place hurdles in the path of a company seeking to push the envelope,
but not in a way that precludes them from trying something new and potentially beneficial. The key
takeaway is that consumer expectations do shift over time, sometimes in response to company practices,
and using default rules rather than mandatory rules creates a space for innovation that, at least in some
contexts, can improve the welfare of both consumers and shareholders. Mandatory rules that are tied to
consumer sentiment will be appropriate in some contexts, especially where consumer expectations are
homogenous and intense, but their tendency towards ossification is an important downside.
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Another important issue concerning the implementation of default rules
concerns institutional design and comparative institutional competency. When a
consumertarian default rule is implemented as part of adjudication over a missing
contractual term, determining the contents of the rule will fall upon the courts.
In making these decisions, courts will be dependent on their assessments of the
evidence offered by expert witnesses, typically psychologists, business, or legal
scholars who have developed rigorous survey instruments to identify the
existence of a consensus consumer expectation or preference. The adversarial
process is obviously imperfect, and there will be some inevitable motivated
reasoning on the part of experts. The aforementioned divide between consumers’
preferences and expectations is one lever that experts can manipulate to produce
results that, at the margins, will be better for their clients. Another lever would
be subtle shifts in language that frame queries in ways that are more likely to
generate the desired results. None of these problems would be unique to the
consumertarian default rule context—similar problems arise in trademark
litigation, for example, and those problems are real but manageable.49 Judges
deciding how to resolve these disputes and weigh this evidence would not be
reinventing the wheel.
Dueling experts called by litigants need not be the only model here, though.
Identifying consensus consumer expectations and preferences is a natural job for
administrative agencies like the Federal Trade Commission, and legislatures also
have the resources and expertise to develop reliable data about the contents of
consumertarian defaults. Organizations like the American Law Institute,
individual academic researchers, and consumer-oriented nonprofits could play
important roles in collecting and vetting these data as well. Moreover, firms
themselves will have incentives to collect such data ex ante so they are better able
to predict the unwritten terms of their contracts with customers or employees.
Some firms may decide that it is appropriate to disclose their survey results
publicly. Courts might give more credence to data that are collected by firms
before a particular dispute arose and that was publicly disclosed and critiqued
before the precise stakes of a controversy became clear.
A final variation on consumertarian default rules extends it beyond the realm
of contractual silence, using it to resolve cases of contractual ambiguity, which is
the primary focus of the authors contributing to this symposium. The easiest case
for extending the approach arises in instances of intentional ambiguity.
Sometimes parties to a contract recognize that they have differing preferences
with respect to a relevant term, and they worry that hammering out an explicit
agreement will scuttle the deal, so they adopt an intentionally ambiguous term
that finesses the conflict. The parties kick the can down the road so it can be
resolved by the parties at a later date or by a court if necessary. This form of
49. See Ben-Shahar & Strahilevitz, supra note 7, at 1780–82 (highlighting how courts can conquer
the challenge of policing biases in survey data resulting from asymmetric information: courts could rely
on each party to scrutinize survey results and highlight defects, threaten to disregard “tainted” surveys
to induce competent ones, or appoint experts to evaluate such surveys).
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ambiguity is analytically identical to contractual silence. In both settings there is
no meeting of the minds, and the courts can justifiably determine the missing
term based on default rules of some sort.
Instances of accidental ambiguity are distinct, though here too the
consumertarian approach can be useful. In a situation involving accidental
ambiguity, the parties did think they were addressing a contingency in the text of
the contract, but they employed language that was not up to the task—perhaps
because of bad lawyering by the drafters or an unanticipated scenario that falls
within the spirit of the parties’ understanding but not the language they
employed. Alternatively, the parties might have had competing interpretations
of the same text, commonly with each party believing that the language embodied
a resolution that was more favorable to its side.
Storybook Homes Inc. v. Carlson50 is a plausible example of this kind of
dispute where both parties think the contractual language favors them. In an
agreement between an employer and employee, both sides believed they had
agreed upon language that served their economic interests, with the employer
believing that a contingent bonus would be small and the employees believing it
would be large.51 The court had to decide whose interpretation of the text was
plausible. A jury sided with the employees, but the trial and appellate courts
invalidated the jury verdicts as a matter of law.52
It turns out that when researchers, including one of us, ran an experiment with
the language employed in Storybook Homes by a large number of lay
respondents, by a wide margin they sided with the employees, just as the jury
did.53 But when the researchers tweaked the language to reduce the ambiguity of
the bonus clause in a way that supported the employers’ interpretation, lay
respondents swung substantially in the employers’ favor.54
Cases like Storybook Homes that involve purportedly ambiguous language
lend themselves to a slightly varied consumertarian approach. In cases involving
ambiguous language in contracts between sophisticated and unsophisticated
entities, the consumertarian approach would survey only lay respondents about
what the contractual text means, ignoring the views of sophisticated respondents,
and adopt the meaning preferred by the majority of consumers where a consensus
emerges. In cases where lay respondents effectively split over the meaning of the
text, the consumertarian approach would adopt the interpretation that
substantively favors the consumers, under the rationale of contra proferentem. By
contrast, sophisticated signatories to a contract would prevail where lay
respondents prefer their interpretation of disputed text by a reasonably wide
margin, such as a sixty-to-forty percent consensus. The existing research suggests
50. 312 N.E.2d 27 (Ill. App. Ct. 1974).
51. For further discussion of Storybook Homes, see Ben-Shahar & Strahilevitz, supra note 7, at
1788–92.
52. Storybook Homes, 312 N.E.2d at 28–30.
53. Ben-Shahar & Strahilevitz, supra note 7, at 1791.
54. Id.
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that lay respondents may have a slight tendency to favor interpretations that
benefit the little guy but that for most respondents these substantive preferences
are swamped by reasonably clear contractual language.55 So the choice to rely
exclusively on the interpretations of non-drafters and to require firms to establish
that at least a small supermajority of lay respondents embrace their preferred
interpretation of the contractual text has the same substantive skew as
consumertarian default rules that would resolve instances of contractual silence.
VI
CONCLUSION
What we call consumertarian default rules are varieties of penalty default
rules that fill in missing terms of a contract based on the expectations of
consumers writ large. Consumertarian default rules can cut the assessment costs
for courts to identify gap-filler terms roughly in half, by directing them to ignore
the expectations or preferences of the sophisticated party that typically drafts an
agreement. Our Article presents a normative case for consumertarian default
rules as well as empirical data about the content of consumertarian defaults in
various privacy and data security domains. It turns out that in key contexts,
consumers overestimate the extent to which the legal system protects their
interests in privacy and security, and they may be trusting third parties with their
data on the basis of those mistaken assumptions. Contract law might act, through
consumertarian default rules, to give them the benefit of the bargain they
suppose they are striking.
Our Article also analyzes several key variations on the consumertarian
theme, including (1) using consumer preferences rather than expectations to
define the content of default terms; (2) adding friction to opt-outs in order to
make consumer expectations or preferences a much stickier basis for consumer
contracts; (3) the role of legislatures and agencies in developing consumertarian
default rules; and (4) using the consumertarian approach to address instances of
ambiguous contract language as well as instances where the contract is silent. We
expect that consumertarian default rules will play an important role in
supplementing existing tools like majoritarian default rules, mandatory rules, and
dual-sided penalty default rules.

55. Id. at 1790–92, 1795–97.

